Interview with Dr Vlado Azinović, Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, and an expert for terrorism and extremism, about foreign terrorist fighters and challenges related to their rehabilitation and reintegration
Very personalized, tailor-made approaches, adjusted to local contexts would be needed to address these challenges successfully, and prevent them from evolving into risks or threats
The foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) phenomenon has been a growing threat to many countries, especially in the last couple of years. What is the current projection, how many FTFs are there nowadays in Syria and Iraq? How many of them that come from the region have been detained there?
The emergence of foreign fighters is not a new phenomenon, and we can observe it throughout history of human conflicts in many parts of the world. The context and motivation were typically different, but the essence was always the same – individuals and groups had been traveling outside their countries or territories of origin, to fight alongside a waring faction, or in pursuit of their own interests and goals, in conflicts that had been fought elsewhere. Such outside involvement had also produced a number of similar consequences for many conflicts as they had typically (a) lasted longer, (b) were more brutal as foreigners had little or no compassion toward their local enemies and innocent civilians alike, and, finally, (3) the presence of foreign elements in an internal conflict had always hampered efforts aimed at establishing or implementing peace agreements. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now estimate that up to 50.000 individuals from almost 120 countries and territories (out of the current 193 UN member states) had traveled to Syria and Iraq from 2011 until 2018. After the military defeat of ISIS (Daesh) in March 2019 a few thousand FTFs and their families remained in the conflict zone, mostly in prisons or refugee camps. Among them are a few hundred persons from South-Eastern Europe or diasporas from the region in the West. The bulk of these individuals are women and children. In addition, as is often quite forgotten, there are also a few dozen individuals from the region associated with ISIS’s main rival group in Syria – Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), previously known as al-Nusra Front. They are still at large, in and around the town and province of Idlib in North-western Syria, close to the border with Turkey.
Some reports identify South-Eastern Europe as one of the main sources of FTFs, along with Western Europe and the Middle East. What are the motivational factors for these individuals to join a terrorist group?
The foreign fighter phenomenon has been researched extensively over the last few years, and dozens of relevant studies and research projects on the issue have been published. These efforts typically recognize at least two types of motives, associated with the so-called push and pull factors (terms borrowed from the theory of migrations) but others as well. Notwithstanding these efforts, and immense body of expertise behind them, it is only when you get to meet former foreign fighters, when you talk to them, when you meet their families, look into their personal police files, their school and medical records, that an understanding of their personal circumstances and motives really begins to emerge. And what you get in the end, and in real life, typically doesn’t match the usual academic or theoretical interpretations. Every single case is specific and different from others. There are, of course, a number of commonalities, but for us to assume that we can understand individual motivation for and drivers of radicalization and recruitment for terrorist groups, from hundreds of miles afar and solely based on our readings of what other people had written about it, is as ill-advised as it is presumptuous.
It is common knowledge that the current generation of terrorists is technologically savvy and active on social media. Terrorist groups are leveraging the internet and social media for recruitment and creating a global security threat. How can we control or suppress this? Can we use it to monitor and trace their activities?
It is obviously a challenge we are still trying to cope with. Regretfully, the unparalleled benefits of the Internet and social media sometimes seem overshadowed by the level of abuse they suffer from. Until recently the unregulated nature of these platforms has enabled many individuals and groups to use them extensively for racially, ethnically and religiously motivated hate speech, as well as dissemination of and recruitment for extremist ideologies and groups. There are a number of ongoing efforts aimed at curbing the trend globally, and I can only hope that they will be successful.
Most of EU member states are rather reluctant to accept their citizens detained or imprisoned in Syria and Iraq. In rare instances of such deportations, these countries opted to accept just orphaned children, and in some cases, a few women.
Violent extremists have suffered defeats in Syria and Iraq earlier this year and there are many who are returning or have to be returned home or travelling to the region. They pose a great security risk. Some of them are using fraudulent identity documents to reach their destinations undetected. On the other hand there is no consensus among the countries of origin to receive them back. How can we respond to this challenge?
Different countries are responding in different ways. Typically, most of EU member states are rather reluctant to accept their citizens detained or imprisoned in Syria and Iraq. In rare instances of such deportations, these countries opted to accept just orphaned children, and in some cases, a few women. More often Western governments went on to cancel citizenships of their FTFs or supported the establishment of international courts that would try their nationals for involvement in foreign fighting in other countries. Iraq has already tried a number of EU citizens some of whom have been sentenced to death. However, these trials have been criticized for a lack of a due process and violation of human rights. The US administration has repeatedly asked Western allies to take their citizens back to their respective countries, but only a few have responded favorably. In the region Kosovo accepted 32 women, 74 children and 4 men in the spring of 2019. Also, in late December 6 women, 12 children and 7 men were repatriated to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, for both countries, this is just a beginning of a long and uncertain process aimed at prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of these individuals.
Last few workshops on FTFs held in RACVIAC focused on rehabilitation and reintegration. What does this mean in practice? What does this process include? Where are the main gaps?
This is obviously a new challenge for all countries that have accepted their returnees, and we will have to adapt to it. Very personalized, tailor-made approaches, adjusted to local contexts would be needed to address these challenges successfully, and prevent them from evolving into risks or threats.
Among those returning there are many women and children who might or might not have been involved in violent activities. Children are an especially vulnerable group. What about them? Can you elaborate more on this?
Most of the children are actually victims of their parents’ bad decisions in life, or were simply born in Syria. Therefore, they should be primarily treated as victims, regardless of the fact that we now know that some children have received military trainings at the age of six, while some have allegedly taken part in atrocities and war crimes. The treatment of these children should be thoughtfully considered and carried out delicately with full respect of their rights and existing national legislations that treat juvenile delinquency.
Evidence gathering, and identifying and bringing witnesses to testify in trials, are oftentimes the greatest challenges for many prosecutors.
You are serving as an expert witness for prosecution in terrorism related cases before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. What are the main challenges in the process of evidence gathering and investigation of offences related to FTFs?
Typically, judges and juries appreciate an abundance of evidence that can help them decide, beyond reasonable doubt, that the indicted individuals had indeed joined some of the terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq and participated in conflict there. To secure a conviction, prosecutors should therefore present a witness or witnesses who could corroborate such claims. This is not always easy. In order to secure convictions, prosecutors sometimes opt to strike plea bargains in exchange for lesser sentencing. Such deals are not only welcomed by the general public but legal experts as well, as it is believed that such rulings undermine the deterring impact they are supposed to make. So, evidence gathering, and identifying and bringing witnesses to testify in trials, are oftentimes the greatest challenges for many prosecutors.
National legislation in the SEE region varies from one country to another. What are the most common offences that FTFs can be prosecuted for?
Many countries have over the last few years criminalized foreign fighting as such, so some of the FTFs could be indicted for actual participation in an international armed conflict or joining terrorist groups there. Also, and depending on circumstances in each particular case, individuals could be prosecuted for a variety of FTF-related criminal offences such as financing, recruiting, facilitating, training, providing material support, inciting terrorist or foreign fighting activities.
In recent times there were many discussions and talks held on the possible new wave of illegal migrations that might include a significant number of FTFs coming to the EU. One of your books recently published is titled “Waiting Game – the Western Balkans and Returning Foreign Fighters”. What do you think, is South-East Europe again (now) in a “waiting game” phase?
We probably are, as we are at the receiving end of a process that we cannot influence in any significant way, but can only try to mitigate and cushion the blow of such migrations.
Professor Vlado Azinović works at the Department of Peace and Security Studies, School of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is also appointed honorary professor at the University of Exeter, UK, and serves as an expert witness for the prosecution in terrorism related cases before the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as a consultant to UN, OSCE, IOM, British Council, Radicalization Awareness Network and International Republican Institute.
Professor Azinović received his PhD in Political Science from the American University of London (UK) and MA in International Relations from Vermont College of Norwich University (USA). Between 1995 and 2008 he worked as a senior editor at Balkan Service, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Prague (Czech Republic).
Azinović is the author, co-author or editor of Talks About Terrorism and Us (2018), Understanding Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans (2018), Understanding Violent Extremism in The Western Balkans (2018), A Waiting Game: Assessing and Responding to the Threat from Returning Foreign Fighters in the Western Balkans (2018), Between Salvation and Terror: Radicalization and The Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in the Western Balkans (2017), The Geostrategic Aspects of Jihadist Radicalisation in the Western Balkans in The Challenge of Jihadist Radicalization in Europe and Beyond, European Policy Center (2017), The New Lure of the Syrian War: The Foreign Fighters’ Bosnian Contingent (2016), Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Nexus with Islamist Extremism (2015), The Lure of the Syrian War: The Foreign Fighters’ Bosnian Contingent (2015), Bosnia and Herzegovina and Terrorism 1996-2011: Defining the Threat, Devising Counterterrorism Strategy in John J. Le Beau’s The Dangerous Landscape; International Perspectives on Twenty- First Century Terrorism (2013), Introduction to the Studies of Terrorism (2012), Assessing the Potential for the Renewed Ethnic Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Security Risk Analysis (2011), Al Qaeda in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Myth or Present Danger? (2007) as well as other book chapters, articles, essays, reviews and projects on terrorism-related issues.
Professor Azinović is the main editor of the Democracy and Security in South-Eastern Europe journal and co-founder and Secretary General of the Atlantic Initiative.
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