INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the RACVIAC Programme 2011 and in cooperation with Albania and Germany, the Cooperative Security Environment (CSE) Pillar organized and executed Arms Control Symposium (CSE-10-S) from 21 to 23 November 2011.

The Symposium took place at the Albanian Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) facilities in Tirana, Albania.

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this symposium was to reflect on political ambition to implement the existing arms control treaties, to present the latest developments in the field of arms control and to open new perspectives on confidence building measures for peace and stability in Europe.

The objectives were:

- To provide information on the historical background, implementation, execution, current situation and the prospect of arms control treaties;
- To raise the awareness of the significance of arms control and confidence building measures;
- To deepen contacts between representatives of national organizations and agencies engaged in the accomplishment of arms control and/or confidence and security building measures;
- To create a supplementary podium where participants would be familiarized with the remaining unresolved issues concerning arms control treaties and the obligations deriving there from.

PARTICIPATION

The symposium was attended by thirty-four participants from nine countries and international organisations, namely from Albania (8), Bosnia and Herzegovina (3), Croatia (2), Germany (3), Greece (1), Hungary (1), former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2), Montenegro (1), Poland (2), Turkey (1), USA (1), SWP (1) OSCE (4), NATO (1), and RACVIAC (3). Participants were representatives of ministries, political institutions and organisations devoted to the implementation of arms control treaties.

OVERVIEW OF THE SYMPOSIUM

The opening session of the symposium, moderated by CSE Pillar Programme Manager LtCol Stefan Miene, started on 22 November 2011 with the welcome remarks by H.E. Ambassador Nikola TODORCEVSKI, Director...
of RACVIAC. It was followed by an address by H.E. Ambassador Eugen Wollfarth, Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania. In the course of the same session, Mr Arjan STAROVA, Albanian Deputy Minister of Defence, delivered a speech on “Efforts to reduce military arsenals - significant contribution to peace, security and mutual trust”. The second session was conducted as a combination of presentations and discussions on:

- The significance of arms control and confidence building measures for peace and stability in Europe;
- Military aspects of the application of existing treaties in the interest of international stability;
- Further developments of goal-oriented OSCE commitments to tackling transnational threats;
- Perspectives of conventional arms control in Europe after the CFE Review Conference;
- Dayton Article IV and V and their role in the security and stability in South Eastern Europe.

The second day (23 November), moderated by Mr Wolfgang Richter, was conducted as podium discussion on the following issues:

**Stock-taking of security risks, available instruments and future objectives of conventional arms control in Europe**

First, the panel considered the implications of a strategic change in Europe in terms of the conventional arms control concept since its inception at the end of the Cold War. It recalled that the current arms control instruments, particularly the CFE Treaty, responded to the dangers emanating from the bloc-to-bloc confrontation of the time, i.e. its high concentration of conventional armed forces in Central Europe and subsequent large-scale, high intensity combined arms battles scenarios. In this context, the CFE Treaty had a clear military objective, which was driven by operational considerations:

1. Elimination of the capabilities for launching major aggressions or geographically limited surprise attacks through a concept of numerical parity at reduced levels of five categories of key armaments.
2. Reduction of high force concentrations in Central Europe and further geographical limitations which prevented reinforcements from rapid return to the line of confrontation.
3. To avoid new force concentrations in Northern Europe, the Balkans and the Caucasus area another zone of particular limitations was created, the so-called “flank region”.

Second, participants agreed that this bloc-warfare scenario was obsolete since the strategic context was completely changed: the Eastern bloc had disappeared, the former Soviet Union had collapsed, conventional armaments had been reduced significantly, Central and Eastern Europe had undergone political transformation, NATO had enlarged and confrontation to a large extent had been replaced by cooperation. In consequence, the limitation of the CFE regime was obsolete although its transparency provisions were still of principal value.

Subsequently, the panel discussed current security risks in Europe and the efficiency of arms control in maintaining European stability. They agreed that a bloc-to-bloc warfare scenario was not in sight and that there was no risk of major aggression against the Alliance. It acknowledged, however, that divergent risk perceptions existed in parallel and should thus be accepted as part of realities in Europe. Although there was no complete unity on the risk assessments and their relative significance for the European stability, the following areas of concern were identified:

(1) Sub-regional instability due to unresolved territorial status conflicts;
(2) Challenges to pan-European stability deriving from the continuation of the political-military division of the OSCE area;

(3) New security risks and challenges originating from outside Europe.

Sub-regional instability due to unresolved territorial status conflicts

There was a widespread conviction among panellists that arms control could not solve political and legal problems regarding the future political status of disputed territories, but it should contribute to limiting local arms race, provide risk reduction and conflict management mechanisms and hedge local conflicts in order to prevent them from evolving into a wider regional conflict. Special attention has to be given to non-state-actors who should be engaged as parties to the conflict in a status-neutral way. Since non-state actors could not become parties to an inter-state arms control agreement, special local agreements should be considered not outside of, but within the political context of pan-European or wider regional agreements.

Security challenges to pan-European stability

The panel agreed that unresolved territorial status conflicts could also damage pan-European stability as major powers tie their strategic interest to sub-regions of concern with active support given to conflict parties.

In a larger context, panellists also discussed a wide range of other strategic issues which held European stability at risk: they evolved mainly from the continuing politico-military division of the OSCE area which stood in sharp contrast to promises given after the end of the Cold War. The symposium participants recognized that the reset of the Russian-US relations had changed the situation and created a more promising political atmosphere of security cooperation. The OSCE was still far away from a common security space, and stability did not appear to be fully secured in crises situations. Several speakers argued that more attention should be paid to avoiding a new polarization between NATO/EU and non-NATO/EU states in Europe. Therefore, arms control should contribute to an inclusive pan-European security architecture, which takes into account the security interests of Russia and other non-NATO states, prevents sub-regional conflicts from becoming hot-spots for a geo-strategic rivalry and creates a strategic framework which hedges local conflict and allows for peaceful solutions. In other words, conventional arms control should contribute to pan-European stability by maintaining a culture of strategic self-restraint and security cooperation. It has to provide mutual assurances that no participating State aims at improving its own security at the cost of the security of others. In particular, no State should aim at military options that could give reason for concern to cooperation partners. Therefore, transparency of military planning, structures and capabilities as well as prevention of destabilizing force concentrations are key elements of future arms control. In this context, restrictions on the stationing of additional substantial combat forces in sensitive geographical areas could play an important role.

New security risks and challenges originating from outside Europe

The panel outlined global security risks and challenges originating from outside Europe such as international terrorism, failed states and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their consequences for a future European arms control.

All speakers agreed that in a regional context a comprehensive security cooperation including traditional arms control was indispensable.

Interim conclusion on the objectives and instruments for a future arms control regime in Europe

The panel did not reach a clear conclusion on whether all areas of concern could be tackled by one comprehensive pan-European arms control agreement or whether security cooperation should rest on a network of interlocking instruments that were particularly geared to pan-European or sub-regional security needs. In any case, the needed engagement of non-state actors required special agreements in their respective local framework. One speaker stated that the structure of the CFE Treaty and its formulations on goals and objectives were principally still suitable but had to be adapted to new requirements. Others doubted whether the further pursuance of the CFE process was still a promising political strategy. Instead, a new instrument should be negotiated from scratch, although the risks of harmonizing divergent
perceptions, objectives and concepts such as definitions of the area of application, forces to be covered, crucial armaments and criteria for limitations were clearly identified.

Arms control tools: limitations, transparency, and categories of armaments

Before turning to particular regional aspects, the panel considered which tools were necessary to achieve the objectives, which were envisaged for future arms control agreements. Although no deep discussion took place on the value and nature of limitations, the goals of preventing destabilizing troop concentrations in sensitive geographical areas and of halting sub-regional arms races suggested that specific limitations were still necessary. Several speakers stressed that transparency of military potentials and activities was an indispensable precondition for creating long-term predictability and confidence as a basis for lasting stability – a view which met general agreement with the audience. In regard to sub-regional conflict scenarios, specific crisis response tools were suggested which would allow for rapid international observation in emergency situations.

Doubts were voiced whether the five TLE categories of the CFE Treaty (which were copied by the Dayton Art IV Agreement) still represented the capabilities used in modern warfare. Several speakers argued that these were characterized by asymmetric conditions and net-centric operations, cyber warfare and space based capabilities such as the GPS system while mass tank warfare was a matter of the past.

Regional aspects of arms control in South-Eastern Europe

Finally, the panel discussed specific regional aspects of conventional arms control in South-Eastern Europe. They concluded that the Dayton Article II and IV Agreements were post-conflict agreements which were not linked to an East-West conflict scenario with its force parity concept, although the CFE Treaty (and the Vienna Document) was taken as a blueprint. Despite its focus on sub-regional security needs, the Dayton Agreements were part of the security culture in Europe and connected with pan-European stability by assuring peace and stability in one of its conflict regions. All participants agreed that the Agreements had been implemented successfully and fully met their objectives. It was also stressed that the special architecture of these agreements gave a convincing example of how to engage non-state entities.

Participants accepted that the Dayton Article II and IV Agreements were imposed to end hostilities and had been subject to international monitoring for 15 years. Several speakers expressed their conviction that State Parties to the Article IV Agreement, after assuming full ownership, intend to continue voluntarily its implementation. There was neither an in-depth discussion on its future objectives nor on the current security risks in the region. A view was expressed, however, that in the future it should respond to security risks emanating from the southern periphery of Europe. No conclusion could be reached as to what extent the future accession to NATO by more States Parties would affect its further implementation.

CONCLUSION

The final conclusion of the Arms Control Symposium panel was that dangerous technologies and conflict sources throughout the world couldn’t be controlled exclusively through military action or other unilateral means. They required a coherent strategy which, in order to be successful, necessitated coordinated international initiatives to regulate those harmful developments — in other words, they required arms control.

RACVIAC promotes arms control on the basis of international arms control treaties and agreements by providing help for their effective implementation and the implementation of confidence building measures adjusted to specific regional political and military environment.

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